Abstract. This paper introduces two new attacks on pkcs#1 v1.5, an rsa-based encryption standard proposed by RSA Laboratories. As opposed to Bleichenbacher's attack, our attacks are chosen-plaintext only, i.e. they do not make use of a decryption oracle. The first attack applies to small public exponents and shows that a plaintext ending by sufficiently many zeroes can be recovered efficiently when two or more ciphertexts corresponding to the same plaintext are available. We believe the technique we employ to be of independent interest, as it extends Coppersmith's low-exponent attack to certain length parameters. Our second attack is applicable to arbitrary public exponents, provided that most message bits are zeroes. It seems to constitute the first chosen-plaintext attack on an rsa-based encryption standard that yields to practical results for any public exponent.
Introduction
Pkcs stands for Public-Key Cryptography Standards. It is a large corpus of specifications covering rsa encryption [13] , Diffie-Hellman key agreement, password-based encryption, syntax (extended-certificates, cryptographic messages, private-key information and certification requests) and selected attributes. Historically, pkcs was developed by RSA Laboratories, Apple, Digital, Lotus, Microsoft, MIT, Northern Telecom, Novell and Sun. The standards have been regularly updated since. Today, pkcs has become a part of several standards and of a wide range of security products including Internet Privacy-Enhanced Mail.
Amongst the pkcs collection, pkcs#1 v1.5 describes a particular encoding method for rsa encryption called rsaEncryption. In essence, the enveloped data is first encrypted under a randomly chosen key K using a symmetric block-cipher (e.g. a triple des in cbc mode) then K is rsa-encrypted with the recipient's public key.
In 1998, Bleichenbacher [2] published an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack against pkcs#1 v1.5 capable of recovering arbitrary plaintexts from a few hundreds of thousands of ciphertexts. Although active adversary models are generally viewed as theoretical issues, 1 Bleichenbacher's attack makes use of an oracle that only detects conformance with respect to the padding format, a real-life assumption leading to a practical threat. Pkcs#1 was subsequently updated in the release 2.0 [15] and patches were issued to users wishing to continue using the old version of the standard.
Independently, there exist several well-known chosen-plaintext attacks on rsa-based encryption schemes [8, 5] . These typically enable an attacker to decrypt ciphertexts at moderate cost without requiring to factor the public modulus. The most powerful cryptanalytic tool applicable to low exponent rsa is probably the one based on a theorem due to Coppersmith [6] . As a matter of fact, one major purpose of imposing a partially random padding form to messages, besides attempting to achieve a proper security level such as indistinguishability, is to render the whole encryption scheme resistant against such attacks.
This paper shows that, despite these efforts, chosen-plaintext attacks are actually sufficient to break pkcs#1 v1.5 even in cases when Coppersmith's attack does not apply. We introduce new cryptanalytic techniques allowing an attacker to retrieve plaintexts belonging to a certain category, namely messages ending by a required minimum number of zeroes. The first attack requires two or more ciphertexts corresponding to the same plaintext. Although specific, our attacks only require a very small amount of ciphertexts (say ten of them), are completely independent from the public modulus given its size and, moreover, are fully practical for usual modulus sizes.
The rest of this paper is divided as follows. Section 2 introduces a new lowexponent attack for which we provide a comparison with Coppersmith's attack in Section 3. Section 4 shows how to deal with arbitrary public exponents while staying within the chosen-plaintext attack model. Counter-measures are discussed in Section 5. For completeness, Appendix A reports practical experiments of our technique performed on 1024-bit ciphertexts.
Our Low-Exponent Chosen-Plaintext Attack
We briefly recall the pkcs#1 v1.5 encoding procedure [14] . Let {n, e} be an rsa public key and d be the corresponding secret key. Denoting by k the byte-length of n, we have 2
A message m of size |m| bytes with |m| ≤ k −11 is encrypted as follows. A padding r consisting of k − 3 − |m| ≥ 8 nonzero bytes is generated at random. Then the message m gets transformed into: pkcs(m, r ) = 0002 16 r 00 16 m , and encrypted to form the ciphertext:
Letting r = (0002 16 r ), we can write pkcs(m, r ) = r 2 β + m with β = 8|m| + 8. Now assume that m has its least Z significant bits equal to zero. Hence, we can write m =m 2 Z and subsequently:
From two encryptions of the same message m,
e mod n for i = 1, 2), the attacker evaluates:
:=ω
The attack consists in the following: assuming that r 1 > r 2 and the number of zeroes Z to be large enough so that 0 < ω v < n, relation (1) holds over the integers, and ω = r 1 − r 2 must divide ∆. Therefore, by extracting the small factors of ∆ one expects to reconstruct a candidate for ω. The correct guess for ω will lead to the message m using the low-exponent attack described in [7] .
Letting R the bit-size of random r (the standard specifies R ≥ 64), M the bit size ofm, and N the bit size of modulus n, the condition w · v < n is satisfied whenever:
eR
With N = R + M + Z + 24, equation (2) is equivalent to:
(e − 1)R + (e − 2)M + 10e − 34 < Z
Determining the Factors of ∆ Smaller than a Bound B
The first step of our attack consists in computing a set D of divisors of ∆ by extracting the primes P = {p 1 , . . . , p i } that divide ∆ and are smaller than a bound B. If all the prime factors of ω are smaller than B (in this case, ω is said to be B-smooth), then ω ∈ D. Since only a partial factorization of ∆ is required, only factoring methods which complexity relies on the size of the prime factors are of interest here. We briefly recall four of these: trial division, Pollard's ρ method, p − 1 method and Lenstra's elliptic curve method (ECM) and express for each method the asymptotic complexity C(p) of extracting a factor p from a number n.
Pollard's ρ-method [4] : Let p be a factor of n. Pollard's ρ-method consists in iterating a polynomial with integer coefficients f (that is, computing f (x) mod n, f (f (x)) mod n, and so on) until a collision modulo p is found (i.e. x ≡ x (mod p)). Then with high probability gcd(x − x (mod n), n) yields p. Lenstra's elliptic curve method (ECM) [11] : ECM is a generalization of the p − 1 factoring method. Briefly, a point P of a random elliptic curve E modulo n is generated. If #E/(p) (i.e. the order of the curve modulo p) is B-smooth, then [ (B)]P = O, the point at infinity. This means that an illegal inversion modulo n has occurred and p is revealed. ECM extracts a factor p of n in exp(( √ 2 + o(1)) √ log p log log p) expected running time. In practice, prime factors up to 80 bits can be pulled out in reasonable time (less than a few hours on a workstation).
Traditionally, ψ(x, y) denotes the number of integers z ≤ x such that z is smooth with respect to the bound y. The theorem that follows gives an estimate for ψ(x, y).
Theorem 1 ([9]). For any non-negative real u, we have:
where ρ(u) is the so-called Dickman's function and is defined as:
Theorem 1 shows that a uniformly distributed random integer z between 1 and x is x 1/u -smooth with probability ρ(u). However, the integers referred to in the sequel are not uniformly distributed. Consequently, the probability and complexity estimates must be considered to be heuristic.
The probability that ω is B-smooth is approximately ρ(R/ log 2 B). Thus using two ciphertexts, the probability of finding all factors of ω is ρ(R/ log 2 B). When using k ciphertexts, k×(k−1)/2 paired combinations can be obtained. Assuming statistical independence between the factorization of the corresponding w, approximately k = 2/ρ(R/ log 2 B) ciphertexts are required to compute the factorization of at least one ω in complexity:
In practice, a factorization algorithm starts with trial division up to some bound B (we took B = 15000), then Pollard's ρ-method and the p − 1 method are applied, and eventually the ECM. In Table 1 we give the running times obtained on a Pentium 233-MHz to extract a prime factor of size L bits with the ECM, using the arithmetic library MIRACL [12] . Table 1 . Running times for extracting a prime factor of L bits using the ECM.
This clearly shows that for R ≤ 72, the factors of ω can be recovered efficiently. For R > 72 we estimate in Table 2 the execution time and the number of required ciphertexts, when only factors up to 72 bits are to be extracted. Table 2 . Running time and approximate number of ciphertexts needed to recover the factorization of at least one ω.
Identifying the Candidates for ω
From the previous section we obtain a set of primes P = {p 1 , . . . , p i } dividing ∆, such that the primes dividing ω are in P. From P we derive a set D = {∆ j } of divisors of ∆, which contains ω. Denoting by d(k) the number of divisors of an integer k, the following theorem [10] provides an estimate of the number of divisors of a random integer. We say that an arithmetical function f (k) is of the average order of g(k) if
We state:
Theorem 2. The average order of d(k) is log k. More precisely, we have:
where γ is Euler's constant.
Theorem 2 shows that if ∆ was uniformly distributed between 1 and n then its number of divisors and consequently the average number of candidates for ω would be roughly log n. Since ∆ is not uniformly distributed this only provides an heuristic argument to show that the average number of candidates for ω should be polynomially bounded by log n.
In practice, not all divisors ∆ j need to be tested since only divisors of length close to or smaller than R are likely to be equal to ω. Moreover, from Eq. (1) and lettingm 2 = r 2 2 β−Z +m, we have:
whence, noting that
In particular, when e is prime, this simplifies to
This means that only a ∆
(mod e) (or ∆ ≡ ∆ j (mod e) if e is prime) is a valid candidate for ω.
Recovering m Using the Low-Exponent RSA with Related Messages Attack
The low-exponent attack on rsa with related messages described in [7] consists in the following: assume that two messages m 1 , m 2 verify a known polynomial relation P of the form
and suppose further that the two corresponding ciphertexts c 1 and c 2 are known.
so that with high probability one recovers m 1 by
From the previous section we obtain a set of divisors ∆ j of ∆, among which one is equal to ω. Letting m 1 = pkcs(m, r 1 ) and m 2 = pkcs(m, r 2 ) we have:
(mod n), and m 2 = m 1 − 2 β ω .
For a divisor ∆ j of ∆, the attacker computes:
If ∆ j = ω then, with high probability, R j (z) = z − m 1 (mod n), which yields the value of message m, as announced.
Comparison with Coppersmith's Attacks on Low-exponent RSA
Coppersmith's method is based on the following theorem [6] : we eliminate m from the two above equations by taking their resultant, which gives a univariate polynomial in r modulo n of degree e 2 . Thus, if |r| < n 1/e 2 , r can be recovered, wherefrom we derive m as in Section 2.3.
In our case of interest, for a message ending with Z zeroes, the stereotyped messages attack works for e(M + R) < N and the random padding attack works for e 2 R < N . Neglecting constant terms, our method of Section 2 is effective for
(3) Fig. 1 . Domains of validity for e = 3 of Coppersmith's stereotyped attack (1), Coppersmith's random padding attack (2) and our attack (3).
Consequently, as illustrated in Figure 1 , for e = 3, our method improves Coppersmith's method whenever
A Chosen Plaintext Attack for Arbitrary Exponents

Description
In this section we describe a chosen plaintext attack against pkcs#1 v1.5 encryption for an arbitrary exponent e. The attack makes use of a known flaw in El Gamal encryption [3] and works for very short messages only. As in Section 2 we only consider messages ending by Z zeroes:
For a random r consisting of nonzero bytes, the message m is transformed using pkcs#1 v1. We define y = c/2 eZ = x e (mod n), M the bit-size ofm, and X the bit-size of x. Hence, we have X = M + R + 10. Assuming that x = x 1 x 2 where x 1 and x 2 are integers smaller than a bound B, we construct the table:
y i e mod n for i = 1, . . . , B and for each j = 0, . . . , B we check whether j e mod n belongs to the table, in which case we have y/i e = j e mod n. Hence, from {i, j} we recover x = i · j, which leads to the message m.
Analysis
The attack requires O B(log n)((log n) 3 + log B) operations. Let φ(x, y) denote the number of integers v < x such that v can be written as v = v 1 v 2 with v 1 < y and v 2 < y. The following theorem gives a lower bound for φ(x, y).
Proof. For y > √ x , we note:
T (x, y) = {v < x, such that v is y-smooth and not x/y -smooth} .
Any integer v ∈ T (x, y) has a prime factor p standing between x/y and y, and so v = p r with p < y and r < y. Consequently,
From Theorem 1 and ρ(t) = 1 − log t for 1 ≤ t ≤ 2, we have:
which, using Eq. (4) gives (3).
Since x is not uniformly distributed between zero and 2 X , Theorem 4 only provides a heuristic argument to show that when taking B = 2 αX with α > 1/2, then with probability greater than log α 1 − α , the attack recovers x in complexity 2 αX+o (1) . Thus, an eight-bit message encrypted with pkcs#1 v1.5 with a 64-bit random padding string can be recovered with probability 0.16 in time and space complexity approximately 2 44 (with α = 0.54).
Experiments and Counter-measures
A number of counter-measures against Bleichenbacher's attack are listed on RSA Laboratories' web site (http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/). A first recommendation is a rigorous format check of all decrypted messages. This has no effect on our attack since we never ask the legitimate receiver to decrypt anything. A second quick fix consists in asking the sender to demonstrate knowledge of m to the recipient which is done by disclosing some additional piece of information. This also has no effect on our attack. The same is true for the third correction, where a hash value is incorporated in m, if the hash value occupies the most significant part of the plaintext i.e.
pkcs(m, r ) = 0002 16 r 00 16 SHA(m) m .
A good way to thwart our attack is to limit Z. This can be very simply achieved by forcing a constant pattern τ in pkcs(m, r ):
pkcs(m, r ) = 0002 16 r 00 16 m τ .
This presents the advantage of preserving compatibility with pkcs#1 v1.5 and being very simple to implement. Unfortunately, the resulting format is insufficiently protected against [2] . Instead, we suggest to use: pkcs(m, r ) = 0002 16 r 00 16 m SHA(m, r ) , which appears to be an acceptable short-term choice (r was added in the hash function to better resist [2] at virtually no additional cost). For long-term permanent solutions, we recommend OAEP (pkcs#1 v2.0) [1] .
Extensions and Conclusions
We proposed two new chosen-plaintext attacks on the pkcs#1 v1.5 encryption standard. The first attack applies to small public exponents and shows how messages ending by sufficiently many zeroes can be recovered from the ciphertexts corresponding to the same plaintext. It is worth seeing our technique as a cryptanalytic tool of independent interest, which provides an extension of Coppersmith's low-exponent attack. Our second attack, although remaining of exponential complexity in a strict sense, shows how to extend the weakness to any public exponent in a practical way.
The attacks can, of course, be generalized in several ways. For instance, one can show that the padding format: (where the plaintext m = m 1 m 2 is spread between two different locations), is equally vulnerable to the new attack: re-defining r = m 1 r , we can run the attack (as is) on pkcs(m, r ) and notice that the size of ω will still be R given that the most significant part of r is always constant.
We believe that such examples illustrate the risk induced by the choice of ad hoc low-cost treatments as message paddings, and highlights the need for carefully scrutinized encryption designs, strongly motivating (once again) the search for provably secure encryption schemes.
